the soul ; but not to intellect, nor to that which is beyond intellect.
IV. It must, however, be enquired whether
purification is the same with a virtue of this kind ?
Or does purification indeed precede, but virtue fol¬
low ? And whether does virtue consist in purifying,
or in the being perfectly purified ? For virtue, while
in the act of purifying, is more imperfect than that
which consists in complete purification, which is
now as it were the end. But to be perfectly puri¬
fied, is an ablation of every thing foreign. Good
however, is something else besides this. Or may
we not say, that if the soul was good prior to her
impurity, purification is sufficient ? Purification,
indeed, is sufficient ; but that which remains will
be good, and not purification. And what that is
which remains, is to be investigated. For perhaps
the nature which is left was not good ; since other¬
wise, it would not have been situated in evil. Shall
we say, therefore, that it has the form of good ? Or
that it is not sufficiently able to abide [perpetually]
in good ? For it is naturally adapted to verge both
to good and evil. Its good, therefore, consists in
associating with its kindred nature ; but its evil in
associating with the contraries to this. It is neces¬
sary, therefore, that it should associate with this
nature, being purified. And this will take place,
through being converted to i|. Will it therefore be
converted after purification ? Or may we not say,
that after purification it is converted? This, there¬
fore, is the virtue of the soul, or rather that which
happens to it from conversion. What then is this ?
The vision and impression of that which is seen,
inserted and energizing in the soul, in the same
manner as sight about a visible object. She did
not, therefore, possess these, nor recollect them.
Or perhaps she possessed them, yet not energizing,
but deposited in an unilluminated state. In order,
however, that they may be illuminated, and that
the soul may know them to be inherent in herself,
it is necessary that she should apply herself to that
which illuminates. But she will not possess these,
but the impressions of them. It is necessary, there¬
fore, to adapt the impression to the true objects
from which the impressions are derived. Perhaps,
likewise, she may thus be said to possess them,
because intellect i& not foreign, and especially is
not so, when it looks to the illuminating cause.
But if it does not, it is foreign even when this cause.
is present. For sciences also are foreign, if we do not at all energize according to them.
V. We must, however, show how far purifica¬
tion proceeds. For thus it will be evident to
whom the similitude is made, and with what God
the soul becomes the same. But this is especially
to enquire how far it is possible to be purified from
anger and desire, and all the other perturbations,
such as pain, and things of a kindred nature, and
to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps,
indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for
the soul to collect itself as it were, from different
places, so as to become entirely impassive, and to
make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be
only remedies and liberations from pain/ in order
that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies.]
It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this
is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminish¬
ing its power, in consequence of [the rational part]
not being co-passive with it. And besides this also,
1 Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, says, that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and satisfy the indigence of nature, but perfect uo energy of the rational part of the soul.
in taking away anger to the utmost of our ability ,
and if possible, entirely ; but if not, the rational
part must not at the same time be angry, but the
anger must be the passion of another part, and un¬
accompanied with deliberation. And this sudden
impulse must be small and imbecile. Fear, how¬
ever, must be entirely removed ; for the purified
soul will fear nothing. Here, also, the energy must
be unattended with deliberation, except it be re¬
quisite to admonish. With respect to desire, it is
evident that there must not be a desire of any thing
base. And as to the desire of meats and drinks
for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself
will be without it. This likewise will be the case
with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is de¬
sirous of connection, it will be I think in the natu¬
ral way, and this not unattended with deliberation*
If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it
will only be so far as it is accompanied with a pre¬
cipitate * imagination. But, in short, the [rational]
* In the original προτύπους ; but it should doubtless be as in the above translation, προπετονς. For this is the word used by Marinus, in his Life of Proclus, when speaking of the cathartic virtues of that philosopher, and alluding to this pas¬ sage in Plotinus.
soul herself will be purified from all these. She
will also wish to render the irrational part pure, so
that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the
agitation may not be vehement, but small, and im¬
mediately dissolved by proximity to the rational
part. Just as if some one being near to a wise
man, should partake of his wisdom by this proxi¬
mity, or should become similar to him, or through
reverence should not dare to do any thing which
the good man is unwilling to do. Hence, there
will be no contest. For reason being present will
be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence,
so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all
moved, in consequence of not being quiet wrhen its
master is present ; and it will on this account
blame its own imbecility.
VI. In conduct of this kind, therefore, there is
no sin, but a correction of the man. Nevertheless
the endeavour is not to be without sin, but to be a
God. Hence, if any thing among the above men¬
tioned particulars should be done without delibera¬
tion, such a one will be both a God and a daemon,
being a twofold character ; or rather, having ano¬
ther with him, possessing another virtue. But if
nothing is done unadvisedly, he will be a God
alone. He will however be a God in the number
of those that follow the first ; for he it is who
came from thence. And if he becomes by himself
such as he came, he is still there. But coming
hither, he will associate with intellect ; and will
assimilate this to himself/ according to the power
of it. Hence, if possible, he will not be agitated,
nor do any thing which may be displeasing to the
master [intellect.] What, therefore, is each of the
virtues to such a man as this ? Wisdom, indeed,
will consist in the contemplation of what intellect
contains. But he will possess intellect by contact.
Each of the virtues, however, is twofold ; for each
is both in intellect and in soul. And in intellect,
indeed, each is not [properly] virtue, but virtue is
in soul. What, then, is it in intellect? The energy
of intellect, and that which is. Bu$ here that which
is in another, is virtue derived from thence. For
justice itself, and each of the virtues, are not in
intellect such as they are here, but they are as it
were paradigms. But that which proceeds from
8 For avro here, it is accessary to read cti ιτγ, conformably to the version of Ficinus.
each of these into the soul, is virtue. For virtue
pertains to a certain thing. But each thing itself
pertains to itself, and not to any thing else. With
respect to justice, however, if it is the performance
of appropriate duty, does it always consist in a
multitude of parts ? Or does not one kind consist
in multitude, when there are many parts of it, but
the other is entirely the performance of appropriate
duty, though it should be one thing. True justice
itself, therefore, is the energy of one thing towards
itself, in which there is not another and another.
Hence justice in the soul is to energize in a greater
degree intellectually. But temperance is an in¬
ward conversion to intellect. And fortitude is
apathy, according to a similitude of that to which
the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive.
But soul is impassive from virtue, in order that she
may not sympathize with her subordinate asso¬
ciate.
VII. These virtues, therefore, follow each other
in the soul, in the same manner as those paradigms
in intellect which are prior to virtue. For there
intelligence is wisdom and science ; a conversion
to itself is temperance ; its proper work is the per-
formance of its appropriate duty, and justice ; and
that which is as it were fortitude is immateriality,
and an abiding with purity in itself. In soul,
therefore, perception directed to intellect is wisdom
and prudence, which are the virtues of the soul.
For soul does not possess these in the same man¬
ner as intellect. Other things also follow after,
similarly in soul. They are likewise consequent
to purification, since all the virtues are purifica¬
tions, and necessarily consist in the soul being
purified ; for otherwise, no one of them would be
perfect. And he indeed, who possesses the greater
virtues, has necessarily the less in capacity ; but
he who possesses the less, has not necessarily the
greater. This, therefore, is the life which is the
principal and leading aim of a worthy man. But
whether he possesses in energy, or in some other
way, the less or the greater virtues, must be consi¬
dered by a survey of each of them ; as for instance,
of prudence. For if it uses the other virtues, how
can it any longer remain what it is ? And if also it
should not energize? Likewise, it must be consi¬
dered whether naturally the virtues proceed to a
different extent ; and this temperance measures,
but that entirely takes away what is superfluous.
And in a similar manner in the other virtues,
prudence being wholly excited. Or perhaps the
worthy man will see to what extent they proceed.
And perhaps sometimes according to circumstances
he will energize according to some of them. But
arriving at the greater virtues, he will perform other
measures according to them. Thus, for instance,
in the exercise of temperance, he will not measure
it by political temperance, but in short he will
separate himself as much as possible [from the
body,] and will live, not merely the life of a good
man, which political virtue thinks fit to enjoin, but
leaving this, he will chuse another life, namely,
that of the Gods. For the similitude is to these,
and not to good men. The similitude, indeed, to
good men, is an assimilation of one image to ano¬
ther, each being derived from the same thing ; but
a similitude to God, is an assimilation as to a
paradigm.
Plot .
On Dialectic.2
I. What art, or method, or study, will lead us·
to that end to which we ought to proceed ? That
we ought, indeed, to arrive at the good itself > and
1 The dialectic of Plato, which is here discussed, is not the same with that dialectic which is the subject of opinion, and is accurately investigated in the Topics of Aristotle. For the former is irreprehensible and most expeditious ; since it is con¬ nate with things themselves, and employs a multitude of powers in order to the attainment of truth. It likewise imitates intel¬ lect, from which it receives its principles, and ascends through well-ordered gradations to real being itself. It also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles ; and explores every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things. The business, likewise, of this first of sciences, is to employ definitions, divisions, anne¬ xations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the inves¬ tigation of causes ; imitating the progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it as the ultimate object of desire.
But there are three energies,” (says Proclus in MS. Com¬ ment. in Parmenid.) “ of this most scientific method ; the first
the first principle of things, is granted, and is de¬ monstrated through many arguments. The argu-