See my translation of Prod us on the Theology of
Plato.
IXXVlll
distinction. Hence Plotinus was more
anxiously employed in profoundly investi¬
gating the nature of this divine world, than
in scientifically unfolding the order of the
beings it contains. Indeed, his genius on
every subject seems to have been more
adapted to an intimate perception of the
occult essence of a thing, than to an expla¬
nation of its gradual evolution, and a
descri ption of the mode ofits participations.
However, though he did not develope the
more particular progressions of true beings,
yet he inserted the principles of this sub¬
lime investigation in his writings; and laid
the foundation of that admirable and
beautiful system, which was gradually
revealed by succeeding Platonists, and at
last received its perfection by the acute,
accurate, and elegant genius of Proclus.1
1 The following beautiful extract from the treatise of Plotinus, “ On intelligible beauty/' is a specimen of his manner of surveying all things, as subsisting without specific distinction in one supreme intellect. The whole of the extract likewise is the result of roepa επιβολή, or intuition through the projecting energies of intellect. “All the Gods are venerable and beautiful, and their beauty is immense. What else however is it but intellect through which they are such? and because intellect energizes in them in so great a degree as to render them visible [by its light.] ? For it is not because their bodies are beautiful. For those Gods that have bodies, do not through this derive their subsistence as Gods ; but these also are Gods through intellects For they are not at one time wise, and at another destitute of wisdom ; but they are always wise, in an impassive, stable, and pure intellect. They likewise know all things, not human concerns [precedaneously] but their own, which are divine, and such as intellect sees. Of the Gods however, those that are in the sensible heaven, for they abound in leisure, always contemplate, as if remotely, what the intelligible heaven contains, and this with an elevated head. But those that dwell in the latter, occupy the whole of the heaven a which
α The heaven which Plotinus here celebrates as the same wdth the intelligible world, and the supreme intellect, belongs, accurately speaking, to that divine order which is denominated by the Chaldaeait theologists νοητος χαι votgo;, intelligible and at the same time intellectual , and is beautifully unfolded by Proclus in bis 4th book On the Theology of Plato.
I shall only add* with respect to the
is there, and survey [its blessed] inhabitants. For all things there are heaven, and there the earth is heaven, as also
are the sea, animals, plants, and men. And in short, every
thing pertaining to that heaven is celestial. The Gods likewise that it contains do not think men undeserving of their regard, nor any thing else that is there [because every thing there is divine.1] And they occupy and pervade with¬ out ceasing the whole of that [blissful] region. For the life which is there is unattended with labor, and truth [as Plato says in the Phaedrus] is their generator, and nutriment, their essence and nurse. They likewise see all things, not those with which generation, but those with which essence is pre¬ sent. And they perceive themselves in others. For all things there are diaphanous ; and nothing is dark and resisting, but every thing is apparent to every one internally and throughout. For light every where meets with light ; since every thing contains all things in itself, and again sees all things in another. So that all things are every where, and all is all. Each thing likewise is every thing. And the splendor there is infinite. For every thing there is great, since even that which is small is great. The sun too which is there is all the stars: and again each star is the sun and all the stars. In each, however, a different property predomi-
1 From the version of Ficinus it appears that the words on tcm ?xh
0fiov, are omitted in the original.
nates, but at the same time all things are visible in each. Motion likewise there is pure ; for the motion is not con¬ founded by a mover different from it. Permanency also suffers no change of its nature, because it is not mingled witli the unstable. And the beautiful there is beautiful, because it does not subsist in beauty [as in a subject.] Each thing too is there established, not as in a foreign land, but the seat of each thing is that which each thing is ; and concurs with it, while it proceeds as it were on high from whence it origina¬ ted. Nor is the thing itself different from the place in which it subsists. For the subject of it is intellect, and it is itself intellect. Just as if some one should conceive that stars germinate from the light of this visible heaven which is luminous. In this sensible region therefore, one part is not produced from another, but each part is alone a part. But there each part always proceeds from the whole, and is at the same time each part and the whole. For it appears indeed as a part ; but by him whose sight is acute, it will be seen as a whole ; viz. by him whose sight resembles that which Lynceus is said to have possessed, and which pene¬ trated the interior parts of the earth ; the fable obscurely indicating the acuteness of the vision of supernal eyes. There is likewise no weariness of the vision w hich is there, nor any plenitude of perception which can bring intuition to an end. For neither was there any vacuity, which when filled might cause the visive energy to cease : nor is this one thing, but that another, so as to occasion a part of one thing not to be
treatise of Synesius 1 On Providence, that
the extracts which are given from it in this
volume, contain, as it appears to me, indu¬
bitable proofs that it was written by him
while he was a Platonic philosopher and a
heathen. This however I leave to the
decision of the intelligent reader. Suidas
amicable with that of another. Whatever likewise is there, possesses an untamed and unwearied power. And that which is there insatiable is so, because its plenitude never causes it to despise that by which it is filled. For by seeing it more abundantly sees, and perceiving both itself and the objects of its perception to be infinite, it follows its own nature [in unceasing contemplation.] And life indeed is not wearisome to any one, when it is pure. Why, therefore, should that which leads the most excellent life be weary t But the life there is wisdom ; a wisdom not obtained bv a reasoning process, because the whole of it always was, and is not in any respect deficient, so as to be in want of investi¬ gation. But it is the first wisdom, and is not derived from another."
* For an account of Synesius, who from being a heathen became a bishop, see Toland's Hypatia.
Ixxxiii
calls the treatise admirable (βανμ.α<ηος) · and
it certainly contains some interesting par¬
ticulars relative to the mystic wisdom of the
Egjrptians, which were doubtless derived
from very ancient sources, and are no
where else to be found*
On the Virtues/
X. Since evils are here, and revolve from
necessity about this [terrestrial] place, but the soul
wishes to flv from evils, it is requisite to fly from
hence. What therefore is the flight? To become
similar, sa)s Plato, to God. But this will be
effected, if we become just and holy, in conjunc¬
tion with [intellectual] prudence, and in short if
we are [truly] virtuous. If therefore we are assi¬
milated through virtue, is it to one who possesses
virtue? But to whom are we assimilated?1 To
divinity. Are we then assimilated to that nature
which appears to possess the virtues in a more
eminent degree, and also to the soul of the world,
and to the intellect which is the leader in it, in
which there is an admirable wisdom ? For it is
reasonable to suppose that while we are here, we
are assimilated to this intellect. Or is it not in
1 See the additional notes at the end of this Volume, for a copious account of the political, cathartic and theoretic virtues, the subject of the present treatise of Plotinus.
Plot,
the first place dubious, whether all the virtues are
present with this intellect, such as temperance and
fortitude, since there is nothing which can be
dreadful to it? For nothing externally happens
to it, nor does any thing pleasing approach to it,
which when not present it may become desirous
of possessing, or apprehending. But if it also has
an appetite directed to the intelligibles, after which
our souls aspire, it is evident that ornament and
the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has
therefore this intellect these virtues ? Or may we
not say, it is not reasonable to suppose, that it
possesses what are called the political virtues, viz.
prudence indeed, about the part that deliberates
and consults ; fortitude about the irascible part ;
temperance, in the agreement and concord of the
part that desires, with the reasoning power ; and
justice, in each of these parts performing its proper
office, with respect to governing and being govern¬
ed. Shall we say therefore, that we are not assimi¬
lated to divinity according to the political virtues,
but according to greater virtues which employ the
same appellation ? But if according to others, are
we not at all assimilated according to the political
virtues ? Or is it not absurd that we should not
in any respect be assimilated according to these?
For rumor also says, that these are divine. We
must say, therefore, that we are after a manner
assimilated by them ; but that the assimilation is
according to the greater virtues. In either way,
however, it happens that divinity has virtues,
though not such as the political.
If, therefore, some one should grant, that though
it is not possible to be assimilated according to such
virtues as these, since we subsist differently with
reference to other virtues, yet nothing hinders but
that we by our virtues may be assimilated to that
which does not possess virtue. But after what
manner ? Thus, if any thing is heated by the pre¬
sence of heat, it is necessary that also should be
hot from whence the heat is derived. And if any
thing is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary
that fire itself also should be hot by the presence
of heat/ To the first of these assertions, however,
it may be said, that there is heat in fire, but a con-
nascent heat, so that it will follow from analogy,
that virtue is indeed adventitious to the soul, but
connascent with that nature from whence it is de«
1 For irvpos θερμού here, I read θερμοτητοε.
rived by imitation* And with respect to the argu¬
ment from fire, it may be said that divinity pos¬
sesses virtue, but that virtue in him is in reality
greater than virtue [because it subsists causally.]
But if that virtue indeed, of which the soul parti¬
cipates, was the same with that from which it is
derived, it would be necessary to speak in this
manner* Now, however, the one is different from
the other. For neither is the sensible the same
with the intelligible house [or with that which is
the object of intellectual conception] though it is
similar to it. And the sensible house participates
of order and ornament ; though there is neither
order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in the produc-
tive principle of it in the mind. Thus, therefore,
we participate from thence [i. e. from divinity] of
ornament, order and consent, and these things per¬
tain to virtue, but there consent, ornament and
order, are not wanted, and therefore divinity has
no need of virtue. We are, however, nevertheless
assimilated to what he possesses, through the pre¬
sence of virtue. And thus much for the purpose
of showing, that it is not necessary virtue should
be there, though we are assimilated to divinity by
virtue. But it is also necessary to introduce per-
suasion to what has been said, and not to be satis» tied with compulsion alone.
II. In the first place, therefore, the virtues must
be assumed, according to which we say that we
are assimilated [to divinity,] in order that we may
discover the same thing. For that which is virtue
with us, being an imitation, is there an archetype
as it were, and not virtue. By which we signify
that there is a twofold similitude, one of which re¬
quires a sameness in the things that are similar,
these being such as are equally assimilated from
the same thing ; but the other being that in which
one thing is assimilated to another, but the latter
ranks as first, and is not converted to the other,
nor is said to be similar to it. Here, therefore,
the similitude must be assumed after another man¬
ner ; since we do not require the same, but rather
another form, the assimilation being effected after
a different manner. What, therefore, is virtue,
both that which is universal, and that which is par¬
ticular t The discussion, however, will be more
manifest by directing our attention to each of the
virtues ; for thus that which is common, according
to which all of them are virtues, will be easily ap-
parent. The political virtues, therefore, of which
we have spoken above, truly adorn and render us
better, bounding and moderating the desires, and
in short the passions, and taking away false opi¬
nions from a more excellent nature, by limiting and
placing the soul beyond the immoderate and inde¬
finite, and by themselves receiving measure and
bound. Perhaps, too, these measures are in soul
as in matter, are assimilated to the measure which
is in divinity, and possess a vestigie of the best
which is there. For that which is in every respect
deprived of measure, being matter, is entirely dis¬
similar [to divinity.] But so far as it receives form,
so far it is assimilated to him who is without form.
But things which are nearer to divinity, participate
of him in a greater degree. Soul, however, is
nearer to, and more allied to him than body, and
therefore participates of him more abundantly, so
that appearing as a God, it deceives us, and causes
us to doubt whether the whole of it is not divine.
After this manner, therefore, these are assimilated,
III. Since, however, Plato indicates that this
similitude to God pertains to a greater virtue [than
that which is political,] let us speak concerning it ;
in which discussion also, the essence of political
virtue will become more manifest, and likewise the
virtue which is essentially more excellent, which
will in short be found to be different from that
which is political. Plato, therefore, when he says
that a similitude to God is a flight from terrestrial
concerns, and when besides this he does not admit
that the virtues belonging to a polity are simply
virtues, but adds to them the epithet political, and
elsewhere calls all the virtues purifications, evi¬
dently admits that the virtues are twofold, and that
a similitude to divinity is not effected according to
political virtue. How, therefore, do we call these
purifications ? And how being purified, are we espe¬
cially assimilated to divinity ? Shall we say, that
since the soul is in an evil condition wThen mingled
with the body, becoming similarly passive and con¬
curring in opinion with it in all things, it will be
good and possess virtue, if it neither consents with
the body, but energizes alone, (and this is to per¬
ceive intellectually and to be wise,) nor is similarly
passive with it, (and this is to be temperate,) nor
dreads a separation from the body, (and this is to
possess fortitude,) but reason and intellect are the
leaders, (and this will be justice.) If any one#
however, calls this disposition of the soul, according
to which it perceives intellectually, and is thus im¬
passive, a resemblance of God, he will not err.
For divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a
kind, that the being which imitates it will possess
wisdom. What then ? Is not divinity also disposed
after this manner ? Or may we not say that he is
not, but that the disposition pertains to the soul ;
and that soul perceives intellectually, in a way dif¬
ferent from divinity ? It may also be said, that of
the things which subsist with him, some subsist dif¬
ferently from what they do with us, and others are
not at all with him. Again, therefore, is intellec¬
tual perception with him and us homonymous ?
By no means ; but the one is primary, and that
which is derived from him secondary. For as the
discourse which is in voice is an imitation of that
which is in the soul, so likewise, that which is in
the soul, is an imitation of that which is in some¬
thing else, [i. e. in intellect.] As, therefore, ex¬
ternal discourse is divided and distributed, when
compared to that which is in the soul, thus also
that which is in the soul, and which is the inter¬
preter of intellectual discourse, is divided when
compared with it. Virtue, however, pertains to