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Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt (1920)

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Guide us to that topmost height of mystic lore which exceedeth light and more than exceedeth knowledge, where the simple, absolute, and unchangeable mysteries of heavenly Truth lie hidden in the dazzling obscurity of the secret Silence.The Mystical Theology, ch. 1, trans. C. E. Rolt (1920)

NATURE OF THE (lODllEAD 5

tii^c^iiisli between ourselves and Him beeausc from
our lower plane of finite JJeing we look up and see
that ultimate level beyond us.

The Super- Inessential Godhead is, in fact, precisely
that which modern philosophy describes as the Ab-
solute, l^ehind the diversities of this world there
must be an Ultimate Unity. And this Ultimate
Unity must contain in an undifferentiated condition
all the riches of consciousness, life, and existence
which are dispersed in broken fragments throughout
the world. Yet It is not a particular Consciousness
or a particular Existence. It is certainly not Uncon-
scious, Dead or, in the ordinary sense, non-Existent,
for all these terms imply something below instead of
above the states to which they are opposed.

Nevertheless It is not, in Its Ultimate Nature,
conscious (as we understand the term) for conscious-
ness implies a state in which the thinking Subject is
aware of himself and so becomes an Object of his
own perception. And this is impossible in the ulti-
mate Nature of the Undifferentiated Godhead where
there is no distinction between thinking Subject and
Object of thought, simply because there is at that
level no distinction of any kind whatever. Similarly
the Godhead does not, in the ordinary sense, live (for
life is a process and hence imphes distinctions) nor
does It even (in our sense) exist, for Existence is
contrasted with non-Existence and thus implies rela-
tionship and distinctions. Consciousness, Life, and
Existence, as we know them, are finite states, and
the Infinite Godhead is beyond them. We cannot
even, strictly speaking, attribute to It Unity, for
Unity is distinguished from Plurality. W^e must
instead describe It as a Super- Unity which is neither
One nor Many and yet contains in an undifferenti-
ated state that Numerical Principle which we can
only grasp in its partial forms as Unity and Plurality.

III. — The Relation of the Godhead to Creation

This principle of Plurality which is thus transcend-
ently contained in Its Undifferentiated Nature com-
pels It to an eternal act of Creation. For all things
pre-exist in It fused and yet distinct, as (shall we say ?)
in a single sensation of hunger there are indivisiby
felt the several needs for the different elements of
food which are wanted respectively to nourish the
various kinds of bodily tissues, or as a single emotion
contains beforehand the different separate words
which issue forth to express it. Even so the Ulti-
mate Godhead, brimful with Its Super-Unity, must
overflow into multiplicity, must pass from Indifference
into Differentiation and must issue out of its Super-
Essential state to fashion a world of Being.

Now since the Godhead thus pours Itself out on
to the plane of Being (which plane itself exists
through nothing but this outpouring), it follows that
the Godhead comes into relation with this plane :
or rather (inasmuch as the act is timeless) stands in
some relation to it. If the Godhead acts creatively,
then It is related to the world and sphere of creation :
eternally to the sphere of creation (which otherwise
could not exist), and thus potentially to the world
even before the world was made. Hence the God-
head, while in Its ultimate Nature It is beyond all
differentiations and relationships, and dwells in a
region where there is nothing outside of Itself, yet
on another side of Its Nature (so to speak) touches
and embraces a region of differentiations and rela-
tionships, is therefore Itself related to that region,
and so in a sense belongs to it. Ultimately the
Godhead is undifferentiated and unrelated, but in Its
eternal created activity It is manifested under the

Relation to Creation 7

form of Differentiation and Rclationshii). It beloni^s
concurrentl)- to two worlds : that of Ultimate Reality
and that of Manifested Appearance. Hence, there-
fore, the possibility not only of Creation but also
Revelation (exqmroK;). Just as the Godhead creates
all thini^s by virtue of that Aspect of Its Nature
which is (as it were) turned towards them, so It is
revealed to us by virtue of the same Aspect turned
towards our minds which form part of the creation.
Hence all the Scriptural Names of God, and this
very Name "God" itself, though they apply to the
whole Nature of the Godhead and not merely to
some particular element or function thereof, yet
cannot express that Nature in Its Ultimate Super-
essence but only as manifested in Its relative activity.
Dionysius, in fact, definitely teaches that doctrine
which, when revived independently ofrecent years by
Dr. Bradley w^as regarded as a startling blasphemy :
that God is but an Appearance^ of the Absolute.
And this is, after all, merely a bold way of stating
the orthodox truism that the Ultimate Godhead is
incomiprehensible : a truism which Theology accepts
as an axiom and then is prone to ignore. The
various Names of God are thus mere inadequate
symbols of That Which transcends all thought and
existence. But they are undifferentiated titles because
they are symbols which seek (though unsuccessfully)
to express the undifferentiated Super-Essence. Though
the terms "God," "King," "Good," " Existent," etc.,
have all different connotations, yet they all denote
the same undifferentiated Deity. There are, however,
some Names which denote not the undifferentiated
Godhead, but certain eternally differentiated Elements
in Its Manifestation. These are the Names of the
Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity. Whereas the
terms "God," "King," "Good," "Existent," etc.,

^ Appeaj-ance and Reality (2nd ed.), pp. 445 ff.

8 Dionysius the Areopagite

denote (though they cannot express it) the same
Reality: the term "Father" denotes something
different from that of " Son," and both of these
from that of " Holy Ghost." The whole Manifested
Godhead is ''God," "King," "Creator," "Saviour,"
"Lord," "Eternal," "Living," etc., but only One
Persona of the Godhead is Father, or Son, or Holy
Ghost. The undifferentiated titles differ from each
other merely through our feeble grasp of the Mani-
festation, and coalesce as our apprehension of it
grows ; the differentiated titles [diaKeKQiudva or
dLaxgloeig) represent actual distinctions in the eternal
Manifestation Itself. Thus the Absolute Godhead
is the Super-Essence ; the eternally Manifested God-
head is the Trinity. As to the reasons of this
Dionysius deprecates all inquiry. He does not, for
instance, suggest that Relationship in this its simplest
form cannot but exist within that side of the God-
head which embraces and enters into this relative
world. Here, as elsewhere, his purpose in spite of
his philosophical language, is in the deepest sense
purely practical, and mere speculations are left on
one side. He accepts the Eternal Distinctions of the
Trinity because They have been revealed ; on the
other hand, he sees that they must belong to
the sphere of Manifestation or They could not be
revealed.

It was said above that the Ultimate Godhead is
Supra- Personal, and that it is Supra-Personal be-
cause personality consists in the faculty of knowing
oneself to be one individual among others. Are
the Personce of the Trinity then, personal, since They
are distinguished One from Another? No, Tlicy are
not personal, because, being the infinite Manifesta-
tion of the Godhead, They are Super-Essential, and
Dionysius describes Them by that title. And if it
be urged that in one place he joins the same title

Relation to Creation 9

to our Lord's individual Human Name and speaks
of " the Supcr-ICssential Jesus," this is because the
Personality of our Lord (and our own personality
also through our union with Him) passes up into
a rei^ion transcending personality, and hence while
the Humanity of Jesus is Personal His Godhead is
Su[jra-Personal. This is implied in a passage from
Hierotheus (quoted with approval by Dionysius him-
self) which teaches that the Deity of Jesus is of an
universal character belonging through Him to all
redeemed mankind.

The teaching of Dionysius on the Trinity is, so
far as it goes, substantially the same as that of St.
Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas; only it is ex-
pressed in more exact, if at first sight somewhat
fantastic, terms. St. Augustine,^ for instance, teaches
that the inner Differentiations of the Trinity belong

1 [Augustine says indeed that the Father and the Son exist, non secundum subslaiitiain, sed sectindtuii relaiivtini {De Trin. v. 6). But Augustine's argument is, that while no attribute of God is acci- dental, yet all attributes are not said with reference to His substance. Certain attributes of God are neither accidental nor substantial, but relative. This applies to Divine Fatherhood and Sonship. For the Father is what He \> in relation to the Son, and similarly the Son to the Father. But these are relations of " Beings," and are relations which are "eternal and unchangeable." Augustine does not afihm a supra-personal reality of God behind the Tiinity of manifestation. For Augustine the Father and the Son are ultimate realities. " But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son ; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father ; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Failier except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance ; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other ; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not different ; because they are so ca led, not according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable." — Aug., De Trin. v. 6. — Ed.]

10 Dionysius the Areopagite

solely to the realm of eternal Manifestation when he
says that They exist seainduvi Relativum and not'
seciiiiduvi Substantiain?- Also he teaches the Supra-
Personality of the Trinity when he says tiiat neither the
undivided Trinity nor any of Its Three Persons is a
particular individuality ; 2 and St, Thomas teaches the
same thing when he says that the Human Soul of
Jesus does ilot comprehend or contain the Word
since the Human Soul is finite [i.e. a particular
individuality) while the Word is Infinite.^

Thus while in the Undifferentiated Godhead the
"Persons" of the Trinity ultimately transcend Them-
selves and point (as it were) to a region where They
are merged, yet in that side of Its Nature which
looks towards the universe They shine eternally forth
and are the effulgence of those " Supernal Rays "
through Which, all light is given us, and whence all
energy streams into the act of creation. For by
Their interaction They circulate that Super-Essence
Which Each of Them perfectly possesses, and so
It passes forth from Them into a universe of Being.

Now the Godhead, while It is beyond all particular
Being, yet contains and is the ultimate Reality of
all particular Being; for It contains beforehand all
the particular creatures after a manner in which they
arc ultimately identical with It, as seems to be im-
plied by the phrase that all things exist in It fused
and yet distinct. Thus although It is not a particular
being, It in a transcendent manner contains and is
Particularity. Again It is beyond all universal Being,
for universals are apprehended by the intellect,

^ De Jrin. v. 6.

^ See De yViii. viii. 4. "Not this and that Good, but tlie very Good . . . Not a good J'crsonality {animus) but good Goodness"; and vii. 11, where he condemns those who say the word persona is employed "in the sense of a particular man such as Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, or anybody else who can be pointed out as being present."

3" Stun ma, Pars III. (). x. Art. i.

RELATION TO (RKATION ii

whereas the Gocllicad is incomprehensible and tlierc-
fore is described as "formless." Nevertheless It con-
tains and is the Ultimate Reality of all universals,
for, even before the world was mack^, It eternally
embraced and embraces all thin<^s and all the uni-
versal laws of their existence. Thus after a tran-
scendent manner It contains and is Universality.
And hence in Its transcendent Nature Universality
and Particularity are contained as one and the same
undifferentiated Fact.

But in this world of Being the particular and the
universal aspect of things must be mutually distin-
guished. Otherwise there could, on the one hand, be
no things, and on the other, no bond of unity between
them. Hence, when the Super-Essence overflows in
the act of creation, It runs, as it were, i.nto the two
main streams of Universal and Particular Being.
Neither of these two streams has any independent or
concrete existence. Taken separately, they are mere
potentialities : two separate aspects, as it were, of the
creative impulse, implying an eternal possibility of
creation and an eternal tendency towards it, and yet
not in themselves creative because not in themselves,
strictly speaking, existent. Nevertheless these two
streams differ each from each, and one of them has a
degree of reality which does not belong to the other.
Mere universal Being, says Dionysius, does not
possess full or concrete existence ; at the same time,
since it is Being or Existence, he does not call it
non-existent. Mere Particularity, on the other hand,
he practically identifies with Non-entity, for the
obvious reason that non-existence itself is a universal
category (as applying to all existent things), and,
therefore, cannot belong to that which has no
universal element at all. Thus the universal stream
is an abstract ideal and possesses an abstract exist-
ence, the particular stream is an abortive impulse and