1 For tiva i here, it is necessary to read eihcvai.
On Matter#
I. All those who have spoken concerning what
is called matter, and who have arrived at a concep¬
tion of its nature, unanimously assert, that it is a
certain subject and receptacle of forms. They
dissent, however, from each other, in investigating
what this subject nature is ; and after what man¬
ner, and of what things, it is a recipient. And
those, indeed, who alone admit bodies to be beings,
and who contend that essence is in these, say, that
there is one matter, which is spread under the ele¬
ments, and that it is essence ; but that all other
things are, as it were, the passions of matter, and
are matter subsisting in a certain w?ay, and thus
also are the elements. They, likewise, dare to
extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly,
they make even their highest ‘ God to be this mat¬
ter, subsisting in a certain way. They, likewise,
give a body to matter, calling it, body mid of qua¬
lity ; and attribute to it magnitude. But others
say, that matter is incorporeal ; and some of these
do not admit that there is only this one matter, but
assert that this is the subject of bodies, and that
there is another matter prior to this in intelligibles,
which is spread under the forms that are there, and
under incorporeal essences»
IL Hence we must enquire concerning this in¬
telligible matter, whether it is, what it is, and after
what manner it subsists» If, therefore, it is neces¬
sary that matter should be something indefinite and
formless, but in intelligibles as being the most ex¬
cellent £ natures, there is nothing indefinite and
without form, matter will not be there. If, also,
every thing in the intelligible world is simple, it
will not be in want of matter, in order that from it
1 From the version of Ficinus, It appears, that instead of αντον αυτών τον Oeor, we should read, ακροτατον αυτών τον θεόν* For his version is, “ sumraum ipsorum deum.w
a For a opiffTots here, it is necessary to read αριστοι$.
and something else, that which is a composite may
be produced. To generated natures, indeed, and
to such as make some things from others, matter is
necessary, in which also the matter of sensibles is
conceived to subsist ; but it is not necessary to
things which are not generated. Whence, also,
does matter proceed, and how does it subsist
among intelligibles ? For if it was generated, it was
generated by something ; but if it is eternal, there
are many principles ; and first natures will have a
casual subsistence. If, likewise, form should ac¬
cede, the composite will be a body, so that body
will be there.
III. In the first place, therefore, it must be
said, that the indefinite is not every where to be
despised, nor that which in the conception of it is
formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself,
and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul
is naturally adapted to apply itself to intellect and
reason, being formed by these, and brought to pos¬
sess a more excellent nature. In intelligibles, how¬
ever, that which is a composite subsists after a dif¬
ferent manner, and not like bodies ; since reasons,
also, [or productive principles] are composites, and
produce a composite in energy, through nature
which has an energy directed to form. But if
energy is directed to something different from itself,
it is derived from something else, and this in a
greater degree. The matter, however, of gene¬
rated natures, always possesses another and another
form ; but the matter of eternal natures always
possesses the same form. Perhaps, also, the matter
which is in sensibles subsists in a way contrary to
that which is in intelligibles. For the former is alter-
nately all things, and is always some different thing.
Hence, nothing in it ever remains, one thing conti¬
nually expelling another ; and on this account,
nothing is ever the same. But in the latter, matter
is all things at once, and hence there is not any
thing into which it can be changed. Matter,
therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since
neither is the matter in sensibles ever without
form ; but each of these subsists after a different
manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or
generated, will be manifest when we have shown
what it is.
IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have de-
monstrated elsewhere ; and this being admitted we
shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore,
there are many forms, it is necessary, indeed, that
there should be something common in them ; and
also that there should be something peculiar by
which one is distinguished from another. This
something peculiar, therefore, and separating diffe¬
rence, are the appropriate form. But if there is
form, there is also that which is formed, about
which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter
[in intelligibles,] which receives the form, and is
always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intel¬
ligible world is there, but this our world is the
imitation of that, and this is a composite, and con¬
sists of matter [and form,] it is necessary that there
also there should be matter. Or how can you
denominate it a world [or that which is adorned,]
unless you look to form ? And how can you look
to form, unless you assume that in which form sub¬
sists ? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly
every where impartible ; but in a certain respect is
also partible. And if the parts of it are divulsed
from each other, the section and divulsion are the
passions of matter ; for it is matter which is di¬
vided. But if the many which are there, are
Plot . C
one 1 impartible being, the many subsisting in one,
—if this be the case, they are in one matter, of
which they are the forms. For this various one, is
to be considered as having a multiform nature. It
must, therefore, be considered as formless prior to
its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away
its variety, its forms, its productive principles, and
intellections, that which is prior to these is formless
and indefinite, and this is no one of the things
which subsist together with and in it.
V. If, however, it should be said, that because it
always possesses these things, and both [the subject
and the forms] are one, this subject is not matter,
neither will the subject of bodies here be matter.
For the matter of sensibles is never without form,
but there is always the whole body. At the same
time, however, this is a composite ; and intellect
discovers its twofold nature. For it divides till it
arrives at that which is simple, and which is no
longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it
is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body.
* Instead of cl Se πολλά op , αμεριστον εστι^ in this place, it is necessary to read, cl he πολλά εν ον αμεριστον εστι.
The profundity, however, of each body is matter.
Hence all matter is dark, because reason is lightf v
and intellect is reason. Hence, too, intellect be¬
holding the nature of each [i. e. of intelligible and
sensible matter,] conceives that which is beneath,
as under light, to be dark ; just as the eye which is
luciform, extending itself to the light, and to
colours which are illuminations, says, that what is
under colours, is dark and material, and concealed
by the colours. Nevertheless, that which is dark
in intelligibles is different from that which is dark
in sensibles ; and the matter of the one differs as
much from the matter of the other, as the super¬
vening form of the one from that of the other.
For divine matter receiving that which defines and
bounds it, possesses a definite and intellectual life.
But sensible matter becomes, indeed, a certain de¬
finite thing, yet neither vital nor intellectual, but an
unadorned privation of life. The morph e ,* also, is
an image, so that the subject likewise is an image.
In intelligibles, however, the morphe is truly form, so that the subject also is real. Hence, those who
* Morphe pertains to the colour* figure, and magnitude of
superficies.
say that matter is essence, if they assert this of in¬
telligible matter, speak rightly. For the subject
there is essence, or rather, is the object of intellec¬
tual perception, together with that which it con¬
tains, and is wholly illuminated essence. To in¬
vestigate, however, whether intelligible matter is
eternal, is similar to the inquiry whether ideas are
eternal. For they are generated, indeed, so far as
they have a principle of their subsistence ; but they
are not generated, [according to the usual accepta¬
tion of the term] because they have not a temporal
beginning, but always proceed from something else,
not like the natures which are always rising into
existence, or becoming to be, as is the case with
the wOrld, but they always are , in the same man¬
ner as the WOrld which is there [has an eternal
subsistence.] For the difference which is there
always produces matter ; since this which is the
first motion is the principle of matter. Hence, it
is called difference, because motion and difference
were unfolded into light together with it. But the
motion and difference wrhich proceed from the first
cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this
cause in order that they may become terminated.
They are, however, terminated, when they are con-
verted to it. But prior to this, matter and diffe¬
rence are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are
without the light of the good . For if light is from
the good , that which receives the light, prior to its
reception of it, does not always possess it, but pos¬
sesses it, being different from it, since the light is
from something else. And thus much concerning
intelligible matter, which we have discussed per¬
haps more than is fit.
VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we
must speak as follows : That it is necessary then,
there should be a certain subject to bodies, which
is different from them, the mutation of the elements
into each other manifests. For there is not a per¬
fect corruption of that which is changed ; since if
there was, there would be a certain essence which
would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again,
does that which is generated proceed into being
from that which in every respect is not ; but
there is a mutation from one form into another.
That, however, remains, which receives the form
of the thing generated, and casts aside another
form. This, therefore, in short, corruption mani¬
fests ; for corruption is of that which is a compo-
site. But if this be the case, eacii sensible thing
consists of matter and form. This, too, induction
testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is cor¬
rupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces
the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should
be resolved into gold ; 1 but gold into water ; and
the water being corrupted, will require an analogous
process. It is necessary, also, that the elements
should either be form, or the first matter, or that
which consists of matter and form. But it is im¬
possible, indeed, that they should be form. For
how, without matter, could they have bulk and
magnitude? Nor are they the first matter; for
they are corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter
and form. And form, indeed, subsists according
to quality and morphe ; but matter according to
the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not
form.
* What Plotinus here says of the analysis into gold, is per¬ fectly conformable to the assertion of Albertus Magnus, as cited by Becher in his Physica Subterranea, p. 319. 4to. For his words are, “ Non dari rem elementatam, in cujus ultima substantiatione non reperiatur aurum.’’ That all metals, likewise, may be analyzed into water, is the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle. See my translation of the Timaeus of the former, and Meteors of the latter.
VII. Empedocles, however, who substitutes the
elements for matter, has the corruption of them
testifying against him. But Anaxagoras, who
makes the mixture of things to be matter, and who
says, that it has not an aptitude to [become] all
things, but has all things in energy, subverts the
intellect which he introduces ; not assigning to it
the production of morphe and form, nor asserting
that it is prior to matter, but that it subsists in
conjunction with it. It is, however, impossible
that intellect and matter should be consubsistent.
For if the mixture participates of being, it follows
that being is prior to it. But if being also is a
mixture, a certain third thing is wanting to these.
If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus
should have a prior subsistence, why is it necessary
that forms should be in matter according to
parvitude ; and that afterwards intellect by a vainly
laborious process should separate them from each
other ? For it is possible to impress quality in mat¬
ter, since it is without quality, and to extend mor¬
phe through the whole of it. And, besides, is it
not impossible that all things should be in every
thing ? But he who asserts that the infinite is mat¬
ter, should explain what this infinite is. And if it
is infinite in such a way as that which cannot fie
passed over, it must be observed, that there is not
any such thing among beings, neither if it is the
infinite itself, nor if it is inherent in another nature,
as an accident to a certain body» It is not, in¬
deed, the infinite itself, because the part of it is
necessarily infinite. Nor is it the infinite as an
accident, because that to which it is an accident
would not be of itself infinite, nor simple, and there¬
fore evidently would not be matter. But neither
have atoms the order of matter, which indeed have
no subsistence whatever/ For every body is en¬
tirely divisible. This opinion is also confuted
from the continuity and moisture of bodies ; and
also from the impossibility of things subsisting
without intellect and soul, which could not be
formed from atoms. Again, it is not possible to
fabricate any other nature, besides atoms from
atoms ; since no artificer is able to produce any
thing from matter which is not continuous. Ten
thousand other objections might and have been
urged against this hypothesis, and therefore it i&
superfluous to dwell longer on these particulars.