o o
this manner it possesses the nature of bulk.
XII. Magnitude, therefore, contributes some¬
thing to bodies ; for the forms of bodies, are in
dimensions. These forms, however, are not gene¬
rated about magnitude, but about that which is
amplified. For if they were generated about mag¬
nitude, and not about matter, they would be simi¬
larly void of magnitude and without subsistence,
or would be productive principles alone. But
forms are conversant with soul, and therefore are
not bodies. Hence, it is necessary that here, many
things should subsist about one thing ; but this is
distended with magnitude. And this [which is
thus amplified,] is different from magnitude ; since
now also such things as are mingled, in consequence
of having matter, pass into a sameness of condition,
1 Instead of μη πω πασα παρ' αντης , it is necessary to read μη π ore παυσασα παρ αυτη$ , agreeably to the version of Fi« cinus.
and do not require any thing else about which they
may subsist, because each of the things that are
mingled brings with it its own matter. At the
same time, however, a certain recipient is neces¬
sary, viz. either a vessel, or place. But place is
posterior to matter, and to bodies ; so that bodies
prior to this will be indigent of matter. Nor does
it follow that because productive energies and
actions are immaterial, on this account bodies also
are without matter. For the latter are composites,
but this is not the case w ith actions. Matter also
imparts a subject to agents when they act, abiding
in them, but not giving itself to act ; for this is not
investigated by material agents. Nor is one action
changed into another, in order that matter may be
in them ; but the agent passes from one action to
another, so that he has the relation of matter to the
actions themselves. Matter, therefore, is necessary
both to quality and magnitude, so that it is also
necessary to bodies. Nor is it a vain name, but it
is a certain subject, though it is invisible, and with¬
out magnitude. For if this is not granted, neither
must we say that there are qualities ; and for the
same reason we must deny the existence of magni¬
tude. For each of these, if assumed by itself alotie,
must be said to be nothing. But if these have a
subsistence, though each of them obscurely exists,
much more will matter have an existence, though
it does not clearly subsist, and is apprehended,
though not by the senses. For it is not perceived
by the eyes, since it is without colour. Nor by
the hearing ; for it has no sound. Nor by the
smell, or the taste ; for it has neither moisture, nor
vapour. Is it, therefore, perceived by the touch ?
Or is not this impossible, because neither is it a
body P For the touch pertains to body,, because it
pertains either to the dense, or the rare, the soft,
or the hard, the moist, or the dry. None of these,
however, subsist about matter ; so that it is per¬
ceptible by reasoning, but not by sense ; and by a
reasoning not derived from, but void of intellect,
on which account, as we have before observed, this
reasoning is spurious. But neither is corporeity
about matter. For if corporeity is a productive
principle, it is different from matter. But if it is a
thing now made, and as it were mingled, it will
evidently be body, and not matter only.
XIII. If, however, the subject of things is a certain quality, being something common in each
of the elements, in the first place indeed, it must
be shown what it is. And, in the next place., how
quality can be a subject must be explained. How,
likewise, can a thing which has quality be surveyed
in that which is without magnitude, and without
matter? Likewise, if the quality is defined, how
can it be matter? But if it is something indefinite,
it is not quality, but a subject, and matter which
we are now investigating. What hinders, there¬
fore, but that it may indeed be void of quality in
consequence of not in its own nature participating
any one of other things, and yet through not parti¬
cipating of any thing, it may be endued with
quality, entirely possessing a certain peculiarity,
and differing from other things, being as it were a
certain privation of them ? For he who suffers a
privation of any thing, as for instance, a blind man,
is [it may be said] a participant of quality. If,
therefore, there is a privation of these things about
matter, how is it possible it should not be endued
with quality ? But if, in short, there is privation
about it, it is in a still greater degree a participant
of quality, if privation is a certain something that
has quality. He, however, who thus objects, what
else does he do than make all things to be qualities,
and the participants of quality ? So that quantity,
and also essence, will be quality. And if each of
these is such like, quality will be present with it.
It is, however, ridiculous to make that which is
different from the participant of quality, and which
is not such like, to be endued with quality. But if
it should be said, this is because a thing that is dif¬
ferent is a participant of quality, we reply, if indeed
it is difference itself, it will not subsist as a thing
that is such like, since neither is quality the parti¬
cipant of quality. If, however, it is different alone,
it is not alone different through itself, but through
difference, and is the same through sameness.
Neither, therefore, is privation quality, nor the
participant of quality, but is destitute of quality, or
of something else, just as silence is the absence of
sound or of some other thing. For privation is a
negation. But a thing endued with quality consists
in affirmation. The peculiarity, likewise, of matter
is not morphe ; for not to possess quality is not to
possess a certain form. It is absurd, therefore, to
call that thing quality, which is not a participant of
quality, and is just as if it should be said that a
thing without magnitude, in consequence of being
without, possesses magnitude. The peculiarity,
therefore, of matter, is not any thing else than that
which matter is : nor is its peculiarity adjacent to
it, but rather subsists in a habitude to other things,
because matter is different from them. And other
things, indeed, are not only others, but each of them
is a certain thing as having form. Matter, how¬
ever, may be aptly said to be alone that which is
another. Perhaps, also, it may be appropriately
denominated other things, lest by calling it in the
singular number another, you should limit [its
boundless nature ;] but by denominating it others ,
you will indicate the indefiniteness of its subsis?
tence.
XIV. That, however, is to be investigated,
whether matter is privation, or privation subsists
about matter. He, therefore, who says that both
are one in subject, but two in definition, ought in
justice to teach us what definition of each should
be given. And to the definition of matter, indeed,
he should adapt nothing of privation ; and to the
definition of privation, nothing of matter. For
either the one is not in the definition of the other,
or each is in the definition of each, or one of them
only is in the definition of the other, whichever it
may be. If, therefore, each is defined separately*
and neither of them requires the other, both will
he two things, and matter will be different from
privation, though privation may happen to it. In
the definition of the one, however, it is necessary
that the other should not be seen, not even in capa=
city. But if they are as a flat nose, and flatness of
the nose, thus also each of them is twofold and
two. And if they are as fire and heat, heat being
in fire, but fire not being assumed in heat, and
matter is so privation as fire is hot, —in this case,
privation will be, as it were, the form of matter,
but the subject will be another thing, which it is
necessary should be matter. Neither, likewise, in
this way will they be one. Are they, therefore,
thus one in subject, but two in definition, privation
not signifying that a certain thing is present, but
that it is not present, and privation being as it were
a negation of beings, as if some one should say
non-being ? For negation does not add any thing,
but says a thing is not, and thus privation will be
as non-being. If, therefore, it is non-being, because
it is not being but something else, will there be
two definitions ; the one indeed regarding the sub¬
ject, but the other privation, manifesting a habitude
to other things ? Or shall we say, that the defini¬
tion of matter respects other things, and that this
is also the case with the definition of a subject ;
but that the definition of privation, if it manifests
the indefiniteness of it, will perhaps touch upon its
nature, excepting that each is one in the subject,
but two in definition ? But if privation in conse¬
quence of being indefinite, infinite, and without
quality, is the same with matter, how will there be
any longer two definitions ?
XV. Again, it must be investigated, whether if
the infinite and indefinite are in another nature
accidentally, how this is an accident, and whether
privation happens to it. If, indeed, such things as
numbers and reasons [or productive principles] are
remote from infinity ; for they are boundaries and
orders, and arrangement is derived to other things
from these ; but these arrange not that which is
arranged, nor the orders of things, that which ar¬
ranges being different from that which is arranged ;
and end, bound, and reason, arrange ; — if this be
the case, it is necessary that what is arranged and
bounded, should be infinite. Matter, however, is
arranged, and also such things as are not matter,
by participating or possessing the nature of matter.
Hence it is necessary, that matter should be infinite,
yet not infinite in such a way as if the infinite was
accidental to matter. For in the first place, that
which happens to any thing ought to be formative ;
but the infinite is not formative. In the next place,
to what existing thing will the infinite be an acci¬
dent? Will it be to bound, and that which is
bounded ? Matter, however, is neither any thing
bounded, nor bound. The infinite, also, acceding
to that which is bounded, loses its own nature.
Hence, the infinite is not an accident to matter.
Matter, therefore, is the infinite ; since in intelligi-
bles alsox matter is the infinite which is there.1
1 “ Power,0 says Proclus, (in Theol. Plat. lib. iii. cap. p.) Sl is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power, indeed, being the cause of occult multitude ; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multi¬ tude. Through this cause, therefore, I think that every being, and every essence, has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this ac¬ count being is one many. — It appears to me also, that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as ana-
And there, indeed, it is generated from the infinity
or power of the one , or from the ever, infinity not
being in the one , but proceeding from it. How,
therefore, is the infinite there, and also here ? Or
is not the infinite twofold ? And in what do they
differ ? They differ in the same manner as arche¬
type and image. Is the latter, therefore, in a less
degree infinite ? Perhaps it is more infinite. For
so far as the image flies from the reality of exist¬
ence, so far it is in a greater degree infinite. For
infinity is in a greater degree in that which is less
bounded. For that which is less in good is more
in evil. Hence the infinite which is in intelligible^,
in consequence of having more of being, is but as
an image [with respect to the infinity of matter.]
But the infinite which is here, as having less of
being, so far as it flies from existence and truth,
and is drawn down to the nature of an image, is a