38 Process and Reality
(xx) That to ‘function’ means to contribute determi- nation to the actual entities in the nexus of some actual world. Thus the determinateness and self-identity of one entity cannot be abstracted from the community of the diverse functionings of all entities. ‘Determination’ is analysable into ‘definiteness’ and ‘position,’ where ‘definitness’ is the illustration of select eternal objects, and ‘position’ is relative status in a nexus of actual entities.
(xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for
itself. By this it is meant that an actual entity functions
in respect to its own determination. Thus an actual
entity combines self-identity with self-diversity.
(xxii) That an actual entity by functioning in respect to itself plays diverse réles in self-formation without losing its self-identity. It is self-creative; and in its process of creation transforms its diversity of rdles into one coherent réle. Thus ‘becoming’ is the transformation of incoherence into coherence, and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment.
(xxiii) That this self-functioning is the real internal
constitution of an actual entity. It is the ‘immediacy’
of the actual entity. An actual entity is called the ‘sub-
ject’ of its own immediacy.
(xxiv) The functioning of one actual entity in the self- creation of another actual entity is the ‘objectification’ of the former for the latter actual entity. The function- ing of an eternal object in the self-creation of an actual entity is the ‘ingression’ of the eternal object in the actual entity.
(xxv) The final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting an actual entity, is one complex, fully deter- minate feeling. This final phase is termed the ‘satisfac- tion.’ It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to its prehension—positive or negative—of every item in its universe.
(xxvi) Each element in the genetic process of an actual
The Categorical Scheme 39
entity has one self-consistent function, however complex, in the final satisfaction.
(xxvil) In a process of concrescence, there is a succes- sion of phases in which new prehensions arise by integra- tion of prehensions in antecedent phases. In these inte- grations ‘feelings’ contribute their ‘subjective forms’ and their ‘data’ to the formation of novel integral prehen- sions; but ‘negative prehensions’ contribute only their ‘subjective forms.’ The process continues till all pre- hensions are components in the one determinate integral satisfaction.
There are nine Categoreal Obligations:
(i) The Category of Subjective Unity. The many feel-
ings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process
of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the
incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integra-
tion by reason of the unity of their subject.
(ii) The Category of Objective Identity. There can
be no duplication of any element in the objective datum
of the ‘satisfaction’ of an actual entity, so far as concerns
the function of that element in the ‘satisfaction.’
Here, as always, the term ‘satisfaction’ means the
one complex fully determinate feeling which is the com-
pleted phase in the process. This category expresses
that each element has one self-consistent function, how-
ever complex. Logic is the general analysis of self-
consistency.
(iii) The Category of Objective Diversity. There can
be no ‘coalescence’ of diverse elements in the objective
datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the func-
tions of those elements in that satisfaction.
‘Coalescence’ here means the notion of diverse ele-
ments exercising an absolute identity of function, devoid
of the contrasts inherent in their diversities.
(iv) The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely
40 Process and Reality
conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object
determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or
of the nexus, physically felt.
(v) The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is
secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data
which are partially identical with, and partially diverse
from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first
phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant
diversity determined by the subjective aim.
Note that category (iv) concerns conceptual repro-
duction of physical feeling, and category (v) concerns
conceptual diversity from physical feeling.
(vi) The Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with category [iv], or with categories [iv] and [v]) one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous, simple, physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, then, in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings together with the derivate conceptual feeling, the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a characteristic of some nexus containing those prehended actual entitles among its members, or of some part of that nexus. In this way the nexus (or its part), thus characterized, is the objective datum of a feeling enter- tained by this prehending subject.
It is evident that the complete datum of the trans-
muted feeling is a contrast, namely, ‘the nexus, as one,
in contrast with the eternal object.’ This type of con-
trast is one of the meanings of the notion ‘qualification
of physical substance by quality.’
This category is the way in which the philosophy of
organism, which is an atomic theory of actuality, meets
a perplexity which is inherent in all monadic cosmologies.
Leibniz in his Monodology meets the same difficulty by
a theory of ‘confused’ perception. But he fails to make
clear how ‘confusion’ originates.
(vil) The Category of Subiective Harmony. The val-
The Categorical Scheme 41
uations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined
by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted ele-
ments congruent with the subjective aim.
Category (i) and category (vii) jointly express a pre-
established harmony in the process of concrescence of
any one subject. Category (i) has to do with data felt,
and category (vii) with the subjective forms of the con-
ceptual feelings. This pre-established harmony is an
outcome of the fact that no prehension can be consid-
ered in abstraction from its subject, although it origi-
nates in the process creative of its subject.
(viii) The Category of Subjective Intensity. The sub-
jective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual
feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate sub-
ject, and () in the relevant future.
This double aim—at the immediate present and the relevant future—is less divided than appears on the sur- face. For the determination of the relevant future, and the anticipatory feeling respecting provision for its grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate com- plex of feeling. The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future. The rele- vant future consists of those elements in the anticipated future which are felt with effective intensity by the pres- ent subject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself.
(ix) The Category of Freedom and Determination.
The concrescence of each individual actual entity is inter-
nally determined and is externally free.
This category can be condensed into the formula, that
in each concrescence whatever is determinable is deter-
mined, but that there is always a remainder for the deci-
sion of the subject-superject of that concrescence. This
subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and
beyond it there is nonentity. This final decision is the
reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal
determination. This reaction is the final modification
of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision
42 Process and Reality
of the whole arises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevant to it.
The whole of the subsequent discussion in the subse-
quent parts either leads up to these categories (of the
four types) or is explanatory of them, or is considering
our experience of the world in the light of these cate-
gories. But a few preliminary notes may be useful.
It follows from the fourth category of explanation that the notion of ‘complete abstraction’ is self-contradic- tory. For you cannot abstract the universe from any entity, actual or non-actual, so as to consider that entity in complete isolation. Whenever we think of some entity, we are asking, What is it fit for here? In a sense, every entity pervades the whole world; for this question has a definite answer for each entity in respect to any actual entity or any nexus of actual entities.
It follows from the first category of explanation that ‘becoming’ is a creative advance into novelty. It is for this reason that the meaning of the phrase ‘the actual world’ is relative to the becoming of a definite actual entity which is both novel and actual, relatively to that meaning, and to no other meaning of that phrase. Thus, conversely, each actual entity corresponds to a meaning of ‘the actual world’ peculiar to itself. This point is dealt with more generally in categories of explanation (111) and (v). An actual world is a nexus; and the actual world of one actual entity sinks to the level of a sub- ordinate nexus in actual worlds beyond that actual entity.
The first, the fourth, the eighteenth, and twenty- seventh categories state different aspects of one and the same general metaphysical truth. The first category states the doctrine in a general way: that every ultimate actuality embodies in its own essence what Alexander *
Cf. “Artistic Ceeation avd Cosmic Creation,” Proc. Brit. Acad., 1927, Vol. XIII.
The Categorical Scheme 43
terms ‘a principle of unrest,’ namely, its becoming. The
fourth category applies this doctrine to the very notion
of an ‘entity.’ It asserts that the notion of an ‘entity’
means ‘an element contributory to the process of becom-
ing. We have in this category the utmost generaliza-
tion of the notion of ‘relativity.’ The eighteenth cate-
gory asserts that the obligations imposed on the becom-
ing of any particular actual entity arise from the con-
stitutions of other actual entities.
The four categories of explanation, (x) to (xiii), con- stitute the repudiation of the notion of vacuous actuality, which haunts realistic philosophy. The term ‘vacuous actuality’ here means the notion of a res vera devoid of subjective immediacy. This repudiation is fundamental for the organic philosophy (cf. Part II, Ch. VII, ‘The Subjectivist Principle’). The notion of ‘vacuous actu- ality’ is very closely allied to the notion of the ‘inherence of quality in substance.’ Both notions—in their mis- application as fundamental metaphysical categories— find their chief support in a misunderstanding of the true analysis of ‘presentational immediacy’ (cf. Part II, Ch. II, Sects. I and V).
It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of. The term ‘subject’ will be mostly employed when the actual entity is considered in respect to its own real internal constitution. But ‘subject’ is always to be construed as an abbreviation of ‘subject-superject.’
The ancient doctrine that ‘no one crosses the same
river twice’ is extended. No thinker thinks twice; and,
to put the matter more generally, no subject experiences
twice. This is what Locke ought to have meant by his
doctrine of time as a ‘perpetual perishing.’
44 Process and Reality
This repudiation directly contradicts Kant’s ‘First Analogy of Experience’ in either of its ways of phrasing (1st or 2d edition). In the philosophy of organism it is not ‘substance’ which is permanent, but ‘form.’ Forms suffer changing relations; actual entities ‘perpetually perish’ subjectively, but are immortal objectively. Actu- ality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses sub- jective immediacy. It loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation charac- terizing the creativity.
Actual occasions in their ‘formal’ constitutions are devoid of all indetermination. Potentiality has passed into realization. They are complete and determinate matter of fact, devoid of all indecision. They form the ground of obligation. But eternal objects, and proposi- tions, and some more complex sorts of contrasts, involve in their own natures indecision. They are, like all enti- ties, potentials for the process of becoming. Their ingres- sion expresses the definiteness of the actuality in ques- tion. But their own natures do not in themselves dis- close in what actual entities this potentiality of ingres- sion is realized. Thus they involve indetermination in a sense more complete than do the former set.