fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one ; for, as remarked above, Sutra 1 9 does not in reality begin a new adhikara/za. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places. — Now neither Sutra 22, nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramanu^-a, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhika- ra;za. — This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikara^a, which treats of the being ' a span long' mentioned in Ka/fe Up. II, 4, 12 ; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpairuti in Sutra 21, and, if so, the angush/Zzamatra properly constitutes the sub- ject of the adhikara^a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI ; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikara^a. — The two next adhikara/zas are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages. — Sutra 39 forms a new adhikara^a, according to 5ankara, but not according to Ramanu^a, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanu^-a's view, that 'gyotik' need not be taken as a nomi- native.— The last two adhikara/zas finally refer, according to Ramanug*a, to one ATMndogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.
From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful — or at any rate all the more important doubtful — passages from the .Oandogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishad s are dis- cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain KMndogya, passage is followed by
INTRODUCTION. xlv
a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those
reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num-
ber of cases although not in all, and from among those
passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac-
counted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by
Ramanu^a, a subdivision countenanced by the external
form of the Sutras.
The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also — as is brought out much more clearly in the vSri-bhashya than by vSankara — in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.
Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas- sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima^s^-sutras are throughout Mi- mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean- ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf- ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/zas ; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the
xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta - sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sahkhya interpretations of cer- tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhy&ya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sahkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sahkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious — and actually attempted — to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas- sages. The S&nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations ; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara ; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is — or can possibly be — sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in- tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.
INTRODUCTION. xlvii
SECOND ADHYAYA.
The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula- tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys- tems irreconcilable with the Ved&nta can be satisfactorily established.
Pada I.
Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration. — To accept the Scinkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smr/ti, which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con- flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.
Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smrzti.
Adhik. Ill (4-1 1) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non- intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes — as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted
xlvill VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
and thereby become simple gold again — do not continue to exist in those causes. — Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub- stance participating in the same characteristics.
Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol-
lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against
other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.
The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, accord- ing to Sahkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may prac- tically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water. — The 6n-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanu^a's view, the Sutra runs as follows : ' If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circum- stance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day ex- perience.' That is to say : If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essen- tially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo. — The construction which Ramanu^a puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears
INTRODUCTION. xlix
from a quotation made by Ramanu^a from the Drami- dabhashyakara \
Adhik. VI (14-30) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is de- fended by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. — The divergent views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.
Adhik. VII (31-33) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutra- kara remarks, the creative principle of the world is addi- tional to, i. e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture. — The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara^a are treated by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^-a on the other is characteristic. Ramanu^*a throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formu- lates the objection based on such texts as ' Thou art that,' while Sutra 33 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scrip- ture. vSankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 33, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.
Adhik. VIII (24, 35) shows that Brahman, although des-
titute of material and instruments of action, may yet pro-
duce the world, just as gods by their mere power create
1 Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakrzta- sukhadukhayoge^pi na sa^ariratvamatrewa jasake ra^-any api jasananuvrz'ttya- tiv^'ttmimittasukhadukhayor bhokt^tvaprasanga/fc. Yathaha Drami^/abha- shyakara^ yatha loke ra^a pra^uradandajuke ghore*narthasawkafe*pi pradere vartamano * pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprwyate abhipre- tams ka lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj ka gandhadin avirva^anopabhogyan dharayati tathasau lokcyvaro bhramatsvasamarthyaHmaro doshair na spmyate rakshati ka lokan brahmalokadi#w Hvii-va^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.
1 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.