40 HERACLITUS.
Heraclitus exhibits, calls for some greater philosophical departure than the above negative principles, which indeed were already well known truths. Moreover, if we take these for his' starting point, we can- get no consistent system, for the doctrine of the universal flux does not lead naturally to the law of opposites, but rather the reverse. Again, neither the flux nor the law of opposites harmonizes with the doctrine of fire. Finally, the pessimistic, nihilistic tendency of the theory of absolute change does not agree well with the deep rationality and world-order which Heraclitus recog- nizes in all things, nor with his psychology, eschat- ology, and ethics (Pfleiderer, p. 7 flf.).
We must look elsewhere for his ground principle. To find it, we must discover the genesis of this philoso- phy, which did not spring into being spontaneously, like Pallas Athena from the head of her father. It could not have come from the Eleatics, for the chro- nology forbids, nor from Pythagoras, whom Heraclitus reviles, nor finally from the physicists of Miletus, with whose astronomy Teichmtiller has well shown our philosopher to be unacquainted. Its source is rather to be sought in the field of religion, and particularly in the Greek Mysteries. In the light of the Orphico- Dionysiac Mysteries, in a word, according to Pfleid- erer, this philosophy is to be interpreted. Here is the long-sought key. The mystic holds it, as indeed Dio- genes Laertius says :
Mrj ra;fyc '^HpaxXeiTOO i;r' dfxcpaXbv ecXee ^i^Xov TO'j<p£<Tcou • /id?.a Toe dua^azo^ dzpaTrcroi;.
With the religion of the Mysteries, in its older and purer form, Heraclitus was in full sympathy. By his
Historical and Critical. 41
family he was brought into close connection with it.
Ephesus, too, his city, was a religious centre. Dio-
genes (ix. 6) relates that he deposited his book in the
temple of Artemis. Heraclitus, indeed, was not a
friend of the popular religion, but that was because of
its abuses, and it was in particular the popular Olym-
pian religion that he attacked. The connection of the
Ephesian with the Mysteries may be considered as a
deep-seated influence which their underlying princi-
ples exerted upon him. These religious principles he
turned into metaphysics. His system as a whole was
religious and metaphysical (Pfleiderer, p. 32 f.).
With this introduction, Pfleiderer proceeds as fol- lows. Heraclitus' starting point lay positively in his theory of knowledge, which was a doctrine of specu- lative intuition and self -absorption. In this sense our author understands the fragment from Plutarch (adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118 ; = frag. 80), ' Edc^Tjadfjoju ifxtwoTov, " I searched within myself," that is, I wrapped myself in thought, and so in this self -absorption I sought the kernel of all truth. Hence his contempt for the masses who act and speak without insight. But does not this conflict with those Heraclitic sentences which place the standard of truth and action in the common or universal {^oi^ou) ? (cp. frags. 92, 91). Do these not lead as Schuster holds, to the rule, Verum est, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est? No, says Pfleiderer, the common here does not mean the general opinion of the majority. All such interpret- ations are sufiiciently refuted by that other passage, ^' To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag. 113). What Heraclitus really meant by the common (f ?>i^6i^) was "the true inward universality." Absorp- tion into one's inner self was absorption into that
42 HERACLITUS.
ground of reason which is identical with the divine
principle of the world. By this universal reason under
which he contemplated all things, Heraclitus meant
nothing different from what by Spinoza was expressed
by "sub specie aetemitatis/' and in subsequent phi-
losophy by "intellectual intuition" and "the stand-
point of universal knowledge.'^ Heraclitus fell back
upon that universal instinct which in the form of
human language is exhibited as the deposit of succes-
sive ages, and which again he did not distinguish
from the voice of the Sibyl, representative of divine
revelation. As respects the source of knowledge,
Heraclitus as little as Spinoza, Fichte and Hegel,
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that
singular and qualitative, divine source in which the
individual participates (Pfleiderer, p. 46 flf.).
The senses, though they do not give us the whole
truth, yet furnish the sufficient data that are to be
interpreted by the light of reason. The errors of the
masses do not arise from trusting the senses, for the
latter give not a false, but a partial account. Their
error lies in missing the spiritual band which unites
the manifold of sense into the higher unity, an error
distinctive of the popular polytheism as against the
religion of the Mysteries (Id. p. 70).
The theory of knowledge, Heraclitus' starting point,
being thus disposed of, Pfleiderer proceeds to discuss
the material principles of his philosophy in their
abstract metaphysical form. The keynote here is the
indestructibility of life. The oscillating identity of
life and death, a truth adopted from the Mysteries, is
taken up by Heraclitus and elevated into a universal
and metaphysical principle. It is based on the simple
observation of Nature, which sees the life and light
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL,
warmth of summer pasBing into the death and
darkneBS and cold of winter, only to be revived and
restored in the never-failing spring. So on a smaller
scale, day passes into night, but night ever again into
day, So everywhere in Nature nothing passes away
but to revive again. From this follows the hope of
the universality of this law, the indestructibility of
human life, and the resolution of the opposition be-
tween the light, warm life here above and the dark,
cold death below. This is the hopeful element which
characterizes the philosophy of the Ephesian. Over
against it was the hopeless creed of the masses, whose
complaint over the inexorable destiny of death found
expression from the earliest times in the despairing
lines of the poets. The conunon view does not see too
much continuance and constancy in reality, but too
little. " What we see waking," says Heraclitus, "is
death, what we see sleeping is a dream " (Clement of
Alex, iii, 3, p. 520 ; =frag, Gi). Which means, that like
the unreality and inconstancy of dreams is this ephem-
eral and perishing existence which we, the vulgar
people, see when awake. Reversing this gloomy view,
the Mysteries taught that Hades and Dionysus were
the same (cp. frag. 127), That is, the god of death
feared in the world below, is identical with the god of
life and joy of the world here above, which is to say
that the regenerative power of life persists even in
death and shall overcome it (Pfteiderer, p. 74 fF.},
From this theory of the indestructibility of the fire
force of life, Heraclitus passes to the ancillary truth of
the unity of opposition in general. Hence he asserted
the identity of day and night, winter and summer,
yoiing and old, sleeping and waking, hunger and
satiety (cp. frags. 36, 78), His whole theory of the
HERACUTUS.
harmony of opposites was, as it were, apologetic.
life rules in death, why does death exist 'i It was in
answer to this question that Heraclitus developed his
science of opposition and strife, by showing the pres-
ence here of a general law {Pfleiderer, p. 84 ff.).
In the same spirit Pfleiderer interprets the much ^
contested figure of the harmony of the world as the j
harmony of the bow and the lyre (see frags. 45, 56).
Without rejecting the interpretation suggested by I
Bemays (Rhein. Mus. vii. p. 94) and followed by most
other critics, which refers the figure to the form of '
the bow and of the lyre, their opposite stretching arms
producing harmony by tension, Pfleiderer finds in the
comparison still another meaning. The bow and the
lyre are both attributes of Apollo, the slayer and the
giver of life and joy. Thus the harmony between the
bow and the lyre, as attributes of one god — symbols
respectively of death and of life and joy — expresses the |
great thought of the harmony and reciprocal inter-
change of death and life (Pfleiderer, p. 89 ff.).
The Heraclitic flux of all things, says Pfleiderer, was 1 not antecedent to his abstract teachings, but the logi- j cal consequence thereof. The identity of life and 1 death led him to the identity of all opposites. But opposites are endlessly flowing or passing into each other. Hence from the principle that everything is opposition, follows the principle that everything flows. The universal flux is only a picture to make his relig- ious metaphysical sentences intelligible (Id, p. 100 ff.).
The Heraclitic fire is real fire as opposed to the
logical symbol of Lassalle, but not the strictly sensible
fire that burns and crackles, as Teichmiiller supposes.
It is rather a less definite conception, which is taken
now as fire, now as warmth, warm air or vapor. It is
Historical and Critical. 45
the concrete form or intuitional correlate of the meta- physical notion of life (Id. p. 120 flf.)-
" The way up and down " refers not only to the trans-
mutations of fire, water, and earth, but holds good in
general for the oscillation of opposites, and particularly
for the polarity of life and death (Id. p. 140).
As one result of his investigation, Pfleiderer affirms
a strong optimistic element in the philosophy of the
Ephesian. He contests the opinion of Schuster and
Zeller that the endless destruction of single existences
is kindred to the pessimistic doctrine of Anaximander,
of the extinction of all individuals as an atohement
for the ** injustice " of individual existence. The pro-
cess indeed goes on, but it has a bright side, and it is
this that Heraclitus sees. Life, to be sure, is ever pass-
ing into death, but out of death life ever emerges. It
is this thought, the powerlessness of death over the
indestructible fire force of life, which Heraclitus em-
phasizes (Id. p. 180 flf.).
Still more decided is his rational optimism, his un- swerving belief in a world well ordered and disposed. A deep rationality characterizes the universe (cp. frags. 2, 1, 91, 92, 98, 99, 96, 19). To express this idea, Hera- clitus used the word Logos, which after his time played so prominent a part in the older philosophy. This word, passing even beyond its signification of " well ordered relation," conveyed finally with Heraclitus, as ^oT-oc f yvoc, rather the idea of Reason immanent in the world (Pfieiderer, p. 231 flf.).
In the invisible harmony we find the same general
thought. As distinguished from the visible harmony,
which meant that external order of Nature insuring to
the trustful peasant the never failing return of summer
and winter, heat and frost, day and night,— the invisi-
46 . HBRACLITUS.
ble harmony was that all-embracing harmony which
is revealed to thought as the rational union of all
oppositions. Against this theodicy there is no valid
objection to be derived from the accounts which repre-
sent the Ephesian philosopher as sad and complain-
ing, nor from the passages descriptive of the evils
of life and the weakness of men (cp. frags. 86, 55, 112,
etc.). In all cases these refer not to the philosopher's
own opinions, but to the errors of the ignorant masses
(Pfleiderer, p. 235 f£.).
The future existence of the soul, though not consis-
tent with his physics and metaphysics, was neverthe-
less held from the religious and ethical standpoint. In
fact it was involved, as has been shown, in Heraclitus'
point of departure, so that we have less reason to com-
plain of inconsistency in his case than we have, in
reference to the same matter, in the case of the Stoics
later (Id. p. 210).
We have given, perhaps, more space to the exposi-
tion of Pfleiderer's work than it relatively deserves,
because it is the last word that has been spoken on
Heraclitus, because, also, it has deservedly brought
into prominence the optimism and the religious char-
acter of his philosophy, and because finally it presents
another instructive example of over-systemization. It
claims our attention, too, because the view it proposes
is a complete reversal of the prevalent conception of
Heraclitus, and if seriously taken, chknges the whole
tenor of his philosophy.
In what follows we shall examine chiefly the two
main points in Pfleiderer's work, namely, the theory
of knowledge and the connection with the Greek
Mysteries ; the latter, because it is Pfleiderer's particu-
Historical. Anb Critical. 47
lar contribution, and the former, because it will open
to us an important aspect of the Ephesian's philosophy.
In the first place, however, it can by no means be
admitted that the doctrine of the flux and the harmony
of opposites represent the negative side of his system,
and are secondary to his theory of knowledge and
his religious dogmas. The unanimous testimony of
the ancients cannot be thus easily set aside. That of
Plato and Aristotle alone is decisive. Pfleiderer objects
that Plato's purpose, which was to establish the
changelessness of noumena against the change of
phenomena, led him to emphasize the flux of Hera-
clitus. But if Heraclitus' positive teachings were, as
Pfleiderer says, first of all the theory of knowledge,
this and not the flux must have been emphasized in the
Theaetetus where the theory of knowledge was Plato's
theme. It is sufficient, however, here to note that
what Heraclitus has stood for in philosophy from his
own time to the present, is the doctrine of absolute
change, and this doctrine may, therefore, properly be
called the positive side of his philosophy. If what
Pfleiderer means is that the theory of knowledge and
not the flux was his starting point, he would have a
shadow more of right. It is, however, misleading to
say that his theory of knowledge was his starting
point, for, as we have indicated in our examination of
Schuster's work, Heraclitus was not concerned with a
theory of knowledge as such. To state in a word what
his point of departure really was, regarded from a
common-sense view, it was his conviction that he was
in possession of new truth which the blindness and
ignorance of men prevented them from seeing (the
point of departure indeed of almost every one who
writes a book), and the three leading ideas in this